The United States has taken a significant step toward securing access to one of Africa’s most valuable untapped mineral resources through a preliminary agreement with Kenya involving the Mrima Hill rare earth and niobium deposit, estimated to be worth $62.4 billion (Sh9.7 trillion).
The proposed partnership represents a major geopolitical and economic development, as Washington strengthens its position in the global competition for critical minerals—an arena where China has long maintained a dominant influence.
A New Model for Resource Development
Announced by Kenyan President William Ruto during the G7 Summit, the agreement is centered on the mineral-rich Mrima Hill site in Kwale County. Unlike traditional extractive arrangements that focus on exporting raw materials, the deal is expected to require that strategic minerals be processed within Kenya before entering global markets.
This approach aligns with Kenya’s broader objective of increasing local value addition, creating jobs, and capturing a greater share of the economic benefits generated by its natural resources.
According to President Ruto, discussions with the United States are already at an advanced stage and could soon result in a formal agreement.
“We have agreed that the minerals will be processed in Kenya,” Ruto stated, emphasizing a shared commitment to local industrial development rather than the export of unprocessed resources.
Critical Minerals at the Center of Global Competition
The agreement comes amid an intensifying global race for access to critical minerals essential for clean energy technologies, advanced manufacturing, electronics, and defense systems.
Rare earth elements and niobium are key components in electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, semiconductors, and high-performance industrial applications. As demand continues to grow, major powers are increasingly seeking secure and diversified supply chains.
China currently dominates much of the world’s mineral processing and refining capacity, particularly for rare earth elements, giving Beijing substantial influence over global supply chains. In response, the United States has been actively pursuing strategic partnerships across Africa and other resource-rich regions to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled processing networks.
Africa’s Growing Leverage
Kenya’s negotiations reflect a broader trend across Africa, where governments are seeking greater control over how their resources are developed and monetized. Rather than exporting raw materials, many countries are now prioritizing domestic processing, industrialization, and local value retention.
Beyond Kenya, the United States has pursued similar partnerships in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, where access to cobalt and copper plays a crucial role in global battery production. Meanwhile, Russia has expanded its footprint in several African nations through mining and resource agreements linked to broader security and geopolitical interests.
A Shift in the Global Minerals Landscape
The proposed Kenya-US agreement signals more than just a commercial partnership. It highlights a changing global minerals landscape in which African nations are gaining greater bargaining power and demanding more equitable terms for resource development.
For Washington, securing access to rare earth supplies is an important step toward strengthening supply chain resilience and reducing reliance on China. For Kenya, the deal offers an opportunity to accelerate industrial growth while ensuring that more value from its natural resources remains within the country.
As competition for critical minerals intensifies, the Mrima Hill project could become a defining example of how Africa’s resource wealth is reshaping international economic and geopolitical relationships.
# The G7 Just Pledged to Break China’s Rare Earth Grip — There’s a Lot of Work to Do
For decades, the world’s advanced economies have enjoyed the benefits of globalization while quietly allowing a critical vulnerability to emerge: dependence on China for rare earth minerals and permanent magnets.
Now, the Group of Seven (G7) nations are finally attempting to confront that reality. At their recent summit in Evian, France, G7 leaders agreed on an ambitious goal: by 2030, no single country should account for more than 60% of their imports of rare earth elements and permanent magnets. Beyond that, they hope to reduce reliance further, targeting a 50% threshold as soon as possible.
The message is clear. The world’s leading democracies have concluded that China’s dominance over critical minerals has become both an economic and national security risk.
The challenge? Breaking that dependence may take far longer than the politicians would like.
## Why Rare Earths Matter
Rare earths are a group of 17 metallic elements that play an essential role in modern technology. On their own, these materials may seem obscure. But when processed into permanent magnets—particularly neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets—they become indispensable.
These magnets are found in:
* Electric vehicles
* Wind turbines
* Smartphones
* Industrial robotics
* Military drones
* Precision-guided missiles
* Radar systems
* Advanced defense technologies
Their unique properties allow manufacturers to build lighter, stronger, and more energy-efficient motors and electronic systems. In other words, rare earth magnets have become one of the foundational technologies of the 21st century.
## China’s Dominance Is Overwhelming
China’s position in this market is difficult to overstate. The country currently accounts for roughly:
* 70% of global rare earth production
* Around 70% of critical mineral refining capacity
* Approximately 95% of rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing
This dominance wasn’t built overnight. For years, China invested heavily in mining, refining, processing expertise, and manufacturing infrastructure while many Western nations outsourced these activities due to environmental concerns, lower costs, and regulatory hurdles. The result is a supply chain where much of the world depends on China not merely for raw materials but for the highly specialized processing required to make those materials usable.That processing stage has become the true strategic bottleneck.
## Why the G7 Is Acting Now
The urgency stems from recent geopolitical tensions.
Over the past several years, Beijing has increasingly used export controls on critical minerals as a policy tool. Since 2020, China has imposed multiple restrictions on key materials used in defense and clean energy technologies.
Last year, China introduced sweeping export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals, raising fears that manufacturing lines across North America, Europe, and Asia could face severe disruptions.
The issue became even more visible during escalating trade disputes with the United States and amid growing tensions surrounding Taiwan.
Officials across the G7 have come to a sobering realization:
If China chose to significantly restrict exports, major sectors of the global economy could be affected almost immediately. The International Energy Agency has warned that trillions of dollars of economic activity outside China could be exposed to supply disruptions if export controls were fully implemented.
For military planners, the concern is even more immediate. Rare earth magnets are embedded in everything from fighter aircraft and missile guidance systems to surveillance drones. Dependence on a geopolitical rival for these materials creates a strategic vulnerability few governments are comfortable accepting.
## Lessons From Japan
The G7 is not the first group to recognize this problem. Japan learned the lesson more than a decade ago. In 2010, following a maritime dispute with China, Japanese companies suddenly found themselves facing restrictions on rare earth exports. Tokyo responded with a long-term strategy to diversify suppliers, invest in overseas mining projects, and build stockpiles. Yet even after more than 15 years of effort, Japan still sources roughly 75% of its rare earth imports from China.
That reality offers a sobering perspective on the G7’s latest pledge.
Diversification is possible. Rapid diversification is much harder.
## Building a Western Supply Chain
Despite the challenges, efforts are underway to create alternative supply chains. In the United States, several companies are positioning themselves as key players in what policymakers increasingly call a “mine-to-magnet” strategy.
### MP Materials
MP Materials operates Mountain Pass in California, the only commercial-scale rare earth mine in the United States.
The company has also expanded processing and magnet manufacturing capabilities in Texas and recently received significant support from the U.S. Department of Defense to strengthen domestic separation and refining capacity.
Its goal is straightforward: reduce reliance on Chinese processing and create a fully integrated American supply chain.
### USA Rare Earth
Another emerging player is USA Rare Earth. The company is developing mining, processing, and magnet manufacturing operations designed to produce rare earth permanent magnets domestically. Backed by federal incentives through the CHIPS and Science Act, the company aims to establish large-scale production capabilities and become a cornerstone of a Western rare earth ecosystem. These efforts represent important progress. But they are only the beginning.
## The Hard Part: Heavy Rare Earths
One major complication is that not all rare earths are equal. Many Western projects focus primarily on so-called “light” rare earth elements.
China, however, remains especially dominant in the production and processing of “heavy” rare earths—materials that are crucial for many advanced defense and high-performance industrial applications. Without secure access to these heavier elements, building a truly independent magnet supply chain remains difficult. Industry experts caution that current Western investments, while encouraging, do not yet solve this deeper problem.
## Obstacles Ahead
The G7’s target may be politically appealing, but achieving it will require overcoming significant obstacles.
### Capital Requirements
Mining and refining projects require billions of dollars in investment before they produce meaningful output.
### Regulatory Challenges
Permitting new mines can take years, particularly in North America and Europe.
### Environmental Concerns
Rare earth extraction and refining are energy-intensive and can create substantial environmental impacts if not carefully managed.
### Community Opposition
Many proposed mining projects face local resistance regardless of their strategic importance.
### Technical Expertise
China’s advantage isn’t just geological.
It also possesses decades of accumulated processing knowledge, engineering expertise, and industrial capacity that cannot be replicated overnight.
## More Than Mining
Recognizing these realities, G7 leaders are discussing additional measures beyond simply opening new mines.
These include:
* Expanding recycling of rare earth materials
* Developing strategic stockpiles
* Supporting refining and processing facilities
* Creating industrial procurement quotas
* Coordinating investments across allied nations
Defense manufacturing may become a particular focus, with governments potentially requiring portions of critical materials to come from non-Chinese sources. Such policies could help create the guaranteed demand necessary for new projects to attract financing.
## The Bottom Line
The G7’s commitment marks one of the strongest collective efforts yet to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals. The goal is ambitious, and perhaps necessarily so. Without clear targets, governments and industries often fail to act. But ambition alone will not be enough.
China’s dominance in rare earths was built over decades through sustained investment, industrial policy, and strategic planning. Reversing that dominance will require the same level of long-term commitment from the United States, Europe, Japan, and their allies.
The good news is that the process has begun. The difficult reality is that diversification is not a five-year project—it may be a generation-long effort.
The G7 has taken an important first step.
Now comes the hard part: turning a political pledge into a functioning supply chain.
As the world accelerates toward electrification and clean energy, rare earth elements (REEs) have become some of the most strategically important minerals on the planet. They are essential components in electric vehicles, wind turbines, smartphones, computers, advanced defense systems, and countless other technologies that power modern life.
A recent study by researchers at the University of Michigan suggests that North America may have the resources needed to build a more self-reliant rare earth supply chain—provided the right economic and policy conditions are in place.
Growing Demand for Critical Minerals
Global demand for rare earth elements is expected to rise significantly over the coming decades. Researchers estimate that worldwide demand will increase from approximately 91 kilotons in 2024 to 123 kilotons by 2030 and 150 kilotons by 2040.
Today, however, the global rare earth industry remains heavily concentrated. China accounts for roughly 70% of global rare earth mining, while the United States contributes only about 11%. This imbalance has raised concerns about supply chain security, economic competitiveness, and national defense readiness.
Assessing North America’s Resource Potential
The University of Michigan team evaluated 28 rare earth deposits across North America, analyzing factors such as ore tonnage, mineral grade, and total rare earth oxide content. Their findings indicate that North America possesses enough rare earth resources to satisfy U.S. demand for decades.
The challenge is not the availability of resources, but whether those resources can be extracted economically.
Many North American deposits are lower in quality than leading operations in China and Australia. In addition, some deposits contain elements such as thorium, a naturally occurring radioactive material that can increase mining and disposal costs.
Despite these challenges, researchers believe several deposits could support a competitive domestic supply chain, particularly if governments provide targeted support during the industry’s development phase.
Light vs. Heavy Rare Earth Elements
Rare earth elements are typically divided into two categories: light rare earths and heavy rare earths.
Light rare earth elements are more abundant and are widely used in magnets, batteries, electronics, and renewable energy technologies. Heavy rare earth elements are less common but highly valuable because they improve the performance and heat resistance of high-strength magnets.
The study found a geographic advantage across North America:
The United States holds substantial deposits of light rare earth elements.
Canada possesses many of the region’s most significant heavy rare earth deposits.
This distribution suggests that a coordinated North American strategy could strengthen supply security while leveraging the strengths of both countries.
Why Domestic Mining Matters
Rare earth elements are classified as critical minerals because they support industries vital to economic growth, clean energy, and national security. Supply disruptions can have far-reaching consequences, affecting everything from electric vehicle manufacturing to advanced military technologies.
Historically, the United States mined rare earths at California’s Mountain Pass mine, but much of the industry’s processing capacity eventually shifted overseas. Today, experts argue that rebuilding domestic mining alone is not enough. North America must also develop processing, refining, and manufacturing capabilities to create a fully integrated supply chain.
The Path Forward
The study concludes that North America has the geological resources needed to establish a more resilient rare earth industry. However, success will depend on balancing economic viability, environmental responsibility, and strategic investment.
As demand for electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and advanced technologies continues to grow, developing a secure domestic supply of rare earth elements could become one of the most important industrial challenges—and opportunities—of the coming decades.
Indian industrial groups Reliance, Vedanta and Adani have shown interest in developing facilities to process Andhra Pradesh state’s significant reserves of increasingly important rare-earth minerals, according to two sources with knowledge of the matter.
With New Delhi seeking to cut India’s dependence on China for rare earths, the three companies are among about 10 who have expressed interest in setting up rare earth facilities in the southern state, one of the sources said.
Andhra Pradesh holds 211 million metric tons of beach sand mineral resources, including rare earths, across 16 identified coastal deposits, according to a draft document. India has 482.6 million tons of rare earth ore resources, according to the Geological Survey of India.
RARE EARTH AMBITIONS
The interest comes as New Delhi steps up efforts to build domestic rare earth mining, processing and magnet manufacturing capacity, while Andhra Pradesh aims to attract 500 billion rupees ($5.2 billion) in rare earth and titanium investments over the next decade.
The plans were set out in a draft government document.
The Andhra Pradesh government, Reliance Industries Ltd, Vedanta Ltd and Adani Enterprises Ltd did not respond to Reuters emails seeking comment.
Andhra Pradesh was among four states identified in February’s federal budget for the development of rare earth “corridors” covering mining, processing and magnet production.
The initiative followed New Delhi’s approval in November of a 73 billion rupee programme to support rare earth magnet manufacturing.
Rare earth elements are essential for permanent magnets used in applications such as electric vehicle motors. While India holds substantial rare earth reserves, it lacks industrial-scale facilities capable of processing the minerals to high purity levels.
CAPITAL INCENTIVES AND OTHER MEASURES
Andhra Pradesh plans to issue tenders for rare earth facilities after securing cabinet approval for its rare earth corridor policy, which is expected within a month, the sources said.
The state also plans to offer capital-linked incentives and additional benefits for projects with investments of 10 billion rupees or more, the sources said.
Andhra Pradesh has been courting large-scale investments, attracting companies including Google and ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel, and aims to secure $1 trillion in investment commitments by 2029, a state minister told Reuters last November.
India’s electric vehicle (EV) market is gaining traction as rising fuel prices, regulatory changes, and expanding model offerings encourage more consumers to switch from conventional vehicles.
Electric car sales rose 25% in the year ending March 2026, with EVs surpassing 5% of India’s passenger vehicle market—a key milestone often viewed as the threshold for mainstream adoption. Growth has been strongest in vehicles priced above ₹1 million, where EVs now account for one in every ten sales.
The recent surge in crude oil prices, driven in part by tensions in the Middle East, has strengthened the economic case for EVs. India imports nearly 90% of its oil requirements, making it vulnerable to global energy price fluctuations. Higher fuel costs have prompted increased consumer interest in electric mobility.
Long-term policy support is also expected to drive adoption. Proposed CAFE-3 emission standards, scheduled to take effect from April 2027, would significantly tighten fuel-efficiency and carbon-emission requirements for automakers. Industry analysts believe the new regulations could accelerate EV penetration by making compliance targets more stringent and enforceable.
State governments are also pushing the transition. Delhi has proposed phasing out registrations of new internal combustion engine (ICE) two- and three-wheelers by 2027 as part of efforts to reduce air pollution.
Analysts expect further growth to be supported by a strong pipeline of new EV launches, particularly in the passenger vehicle and two-wheeler segments. Nomura forecasts EV penetration in India’s passenger vehicle market could reach 9% by 2030.
Despite the positive outlook, significant challenges remain. Charging infrastructure continues to lag demand, with public charging stations increasing to more than 10,000 nationwide but remaining concentrated in a few states. Consumer concerns over charging availability and driving range continue to slow adoption.
India also remains heavily dependent on imported battery materials and rare earth elements, exposing the sector to supply-chain and geopolitical risks. Industry experts note that developing a fully integrated domestic EV supply chain could take more than a decade.
While rising fuel prices and supportive policies are boosting demand, industry observers say the pace of India’s EV transition will ultimately depend on regulatory certainty, infrastructure expansion, and stronger domestic manufacturing capabilities.
This version is structured in a concise business-news style, focusing on market trends, drivers, forecasts, and risks rather than narrative storytelling.
Pip: Welcome to a show about the rocks that run the world — or at least the ones that run the drones, the defense contracts, and the supply chains holding everything together.
Mara: Today we're looking at work from Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng, and it lands squarely in rare earth territory — specifically who controls the magnets inside American military drones, and what one company is doing about it.
Pip: Let's start with the Pentagon's drone ambitions and the supply chain problem underneath them.
The Pentagon's Drone Ambitions vs. China's Magnet Grip
Mara: The setup here is stark: the United States military wants a lot of drones, fast, and almost every one of them depends on a component it doesn't control.
Pip: The post puts the numbers plainly: "The Pentagon recently placed the largest drone order in American history — 30,000 one-way attack drones, with plans to scale past 300,000 by early 2028."
Mara: And the constraint hiding inside that ambition is the rare earth magnet. According to Goldman Sachs figures cited in the post, roughly 98 percent of the world's magnets are manufactured in China. So the upshot is: you can order all the drones you want, but if the magnets aren't there, the drones aren't either.
Pip: Three hundred thousand drones is a serious procurement target. The magnet math is the part that doesn't scale with good intentions.
Mara: That's where REalloys enters the picture. The post describes the company as holding the only fully non-Chinese mine-to-magnet heavy rare earth supply chain in North America — covering processed metals, finished alloys, and the magnet-ready inputs that defense contractors actually need.
Pip: So the chain runs from the ground to the finished input, entirely outside China. That's the gap REalloys is positioned to fill, and it's a gap the Pentagon's own order just made very visible.
Mara: The original reporting is sourced to The Globe and Mail, and the post frames REalloys not as a speculative play but as a company that has spent years building toward exactly this moment in defense procurement.
Pip: The timing is either very good planning or very good luck — probably some of both.
Mara: Rare earth supply chains don't move fast, but defense procurement deadlines do. That tension is what makes this story worth watching.
Pip: The magnets are small. The stakes are not. More next time.
China has expanded its zero-tariff policy to include all 53 African nations with which it maintains diplomatic relations, opening new opportunities for African exports and industrial development at a time when global trade is increasingly affected by protectionist policies.
The policy took effect immediately, with a shipment of 24 tonnes of South African apples becoming the first African products to enter China under the expanded tariff-free arrangement after clearing customs in Shenzhen.
Previously, China had already eliminated tariffs on all product categories from 33 of Africa’s least-developed countries starting December 2024. The latest expansion extends similar benefits to 20 additional African economies, including Kenya, Egypt, and Nigeria. Under the arrangement, these countries will enjoy preferential zero-tariff access for an initial two-year period while China works toward establishing long-term trade agreements through the China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development framework.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, the measure will improve the competitiveness of African exports such as cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Kenyan coffee and avocados, and South African citrus fruits and wine, which previously faced tariffs ranging from 8% to 30%. The ministry also believes the initiative will encourage greater investment in Africa by attracting capital, technology, equipment, and management expertise to support local processing industries. This, in turn, is expected to create a more balanced and sustainable trade relationship between China and Africa.
The decision has been widely welcomed as a strong signal of China’s commitment to economic openness during a period when many countries are adopting more restrictive trade policies. African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf described the move as both timely and beneficial for Africa, noting that the continent continues to face numerous global challenges, including rising protectionism. He expressed appreciation for what he called a gesture of solidarity from China.
China remains Africa’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade reached a record US$348 billion in 2025, with Chinese imports from Africa totaling US$123 billion, representing year-on-year growth of 5.4%.
Experts believe the impact of the policy will extend beyond trade. Scholars from institutions including Tsinghua University and University of International Business and Economics argue that tariff-free access could encourage multinational companies to establish manufacturing and processing facilities in Africa, supporting industrialization and helping the continent move beyond its traditional role as a supplier of raw materials.
The initiative also aligns with China’s broader economic strategy of expanding international openness and improving trade and investment cooperation through 2030. Analysts suggest that Chinese consumers will benefit as well, gaining access to a wider range of competitively priced African products. Businesses have already begun preparing to increase imports, including Kenyan tea processors that expect significantly lower costs under the new tariff regime.
Overall, the expanded zero-tariff policy is expected to strengthen China-Africa economic ties, boost African exports, attract investment, and support long-term industrial growth across the continent.
Pip: Welcome to the podcast where we dig into mining, mineral processing, and metals — sometimes literally. Today we're following the rare earth supply chain from California to the Arctic, courtesy of Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng.
Mara: That's right — we're looking at why Greenland keeps coming up in rare earth conversations, and what the real obstacles are to building a Western supply chain that actually works.
Pip: Let's start with the Mountain Pass story, and why it matters more than the map suggests.
Why Greenland? The Mountain Pass lesson and what comes next
Mara: The central question here is why Western policymakers keep looking at Greenland when the United States already has a rare earth mine in California — and what that question reveals about the gap between mining and refining.
Pip: The post quotes a researcher named Chrisey to put the technical problem in plain terms: "Two different rare earth elements may be fractions of an angstrom different in diameter — that means it's very difficult to separate using physical means. The processes that are used right now can be 100 steps," with the procedure described as very expensive and environmentally hazardous due to the chemicals used.
Mara: So the upshot is that even if you have the ore in the ground, separating and purifying individual rare earth elements is a genuinely hard chemical problem — not just a permitting or investment problem.
Pip: Mountain Pass is the case study. Molycorp tried to be a one-stop American rare earths solution, and by 2013 revenues were in free fall. The post notes that Molycorp's most profitable assets ended up transferred to Chinese-linked Neo Materials, the mine was purchased out of bankruptcy by a consortium that included a Chinese-owned firm, and Mountain Pass was sending U.S.-mined concentrate to China for processing.
Mara: The dream of domestic end-to-end production collapsed not because the ore ran out, but because the refining technology and economics didn't hold. The post cites Reuters reporting that China controls 87 percent of global rare earths refining capacity, and that Beijing deliberately keeps prices for finished products low to inhibit foreign competition from building their own processing plants.
Pip: It's a neat trap — dig all you want, just send us the concentrate.
Mara: The post lays out a three-step prescription in response: invest in research and development on refining technologies first, build refineries at existing mines with infrastructure before opening new ones, and use tariffs or other tools to take price control away from China while local operations optimize. The reserve numbers matter here too — Greenland has 1.5 million metric tons of rare earth reserves, while the U.S. sits at 1.9 million. Neither country is close to China's 44 million metric tons.
Pip: Which reframes the Greenland question entirely — it's not about the ore, it's about whether Western refining can exist at all before anyone starts a new mine.
Mara: Exactly the argument the post makes. The infrastructure and processing capability have to come before the next frontier dig, or the concentrate just travels east again.
Pip: The economics of refining are where the real supply chain battle is being fought — and that's a thread worth pulling on next.
Mara: The Mountain Pass story keeps repeating because the refining problem keeps being skipped.
Pip: Build the refinery first, then talk about Greenland. That order matters.
Pip: Welcome to the podcast where we track what the earth gives up and what the markets make of it — rare earths, trade deficits, and the occasional geopolitical scramble.
Mara: Today’s episode, shaped by posts from Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng, covers three connected territories: Europe pushing back on its trade imbalance with China, a long-term rare earth supply deal out of Greenland, and the magnet problem sitting inside the Pentagon’s drone ambitions.
Pip: Let’s start with the EU-China trade picture.
EU and China: Rebalancing an Unequal Trade
Mara: The European Union is signaling it wants a different kind of relationship with China — one where the trade flows more evenly and the strategic vulnerabilities get addressed.
Pip: The numbers make the case bluntly. The EU’s trade deficit with China reached approximately 360 billion euros last year, and the post notes that “particular concern has centered on rare earth minerals after China imposed export restrictions last year, exposing Europe’s heavy reliance on Chinese supplies.”
Mara: So the upshot is Europe is not just haggling over tariffs — it’s reckoning with structural dependency. A summit in Brussels on June 18 and 19 is expected to advance those discussions, with a possible visit from China’s commerce minister also on the table.
Pip: Which makes Greenland’s rare earth story land with considerably more weight.
The Tanbreez Deal: Greenland’s 15-Year Commitment
Mara: The Tanbreez project in Greenland is one of the world’s largest known heavy rare earth deposits, and it just got a significant commercial anchor.
Pip: Critical Metals has signed a 15-year binding offtake agreement with REalloys, and the post quotes directly: “REalloys will receive priority rights to concentrate containing higher levels of the critical heavy rare earth elements, dysprosium and terbium, along with a right of first refusal over additional volumes.”
Mara: Those two elements — dysprosium and terbium — are exactly the heavy rare earths that go into the high-performance magnets defense and clean energy applications depend on. The deal formalizes and expands a non-binding agreement from last October, and follows Greenland’s April approval for Critical Metals to raise its ownership stake in the project to 92.5%.
Pip: Fifteen years is a long runway. That’s not a spot purchase — that’s a supply chain being built from the ground up.
Mara: Pricing is linked to international rare earth oxide benchmarks, and deliveries ship from the Tanbreez port in southern Greenland. The post frames this in the context of the U.S. and its allies stepping up efforts to secure critical mineral supplies outside China.
Pip: And REalloys turns up in the drone story too — which is where the magnet dependency gets very concrete.
300,000 Drones and the Magnet Bottleneck
Mara: The Pentagon has placed the largest drone order in American history — 30,000 one-way attack drones, with a target of scaling past 300,000 by early 2028. Every one runs on a rare earth magnet.
Pip: And the post puts the constraint in one number: “roughly 98% of the world’s magnets are manufactured in China.” That is a supply chain risk dressed up as an ambition.
Mara: REalloys is positioned as a direct response to that gap — holding what the post describes as the only fully non-Chinese mine-to-magnet heavy rare earth supply chain in North America, from processed metals through to magnet-ready inputs.
Pip: The Greenland offtake deal and this Pentagon supply problem are clearly two ends of the same chain.
Mara: Whether it’s Brussels negotiating with Beijing, Greenland locking in a 15-year deal, or the Pentagon counting magnets — the throughline is the same scramble to diversify critical mineral supply.
Pip: Next time, we’ll see where that scramble leads. The deposits are finite; the demand is not.
A potentially widening budget deficit amid soaring global oil prices has prompted Jakarta to explore alternative revenue sources, including export duties on nickel and coal, commodities that are currently benefiting from relatively strong price trends.
The push for rapid revenue mobilization, however, appears to be running ahead of sectoral readiness. President Prabowo Subianto has approved a coal export duty, with tariffs reportedly still under discussion depending on price levels, initially slated for implementation on April 1. However, its rollout remains subject to ongoing cross-ministerial deliberations, particularly regarding its impact on mining sector profitability.
As highlighted by Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Bahlil Lahadalia, the structure of Indonesia’s coal exports complicates policy design. Around 60-70 percent of exports consist of low-calorific, lower-value coal, meaning that a uniform export duty risks disproportionately burdening producers operating on thin margins. This has prompted the minister to adopt a more cautious stance, delaying implementation until a more calibrated approach is formulated. Yet this caution contrasts with parallel intervention on the supply side. The government has tightened production through the Work Plan and Budget (RKAB) mechanism, capping approved output at around 580 million tonnes. This figure is well below the previous year’s realization of 790 million tonnes, aimed at preventing oversupply and supporting global prices.
The escalation of geopolitical conflict in the Middle East has helped sustain elevated energy and mineral commodity prices. Coal prices have remained consistently above US$135 per tonne, while nickel prices have also stayed relatively stable. This sustained price momentum has prompted the government to take strategic measures to safeguard the state budget. Export duty revenues in the 2026 state budget are projected to surge to Rp 42.56 trillion (US$2.5 billion), marking an increase of more than 850 percent. This sharp rise underscores the urgency behind recent policy initiatives.
This creates a fragmented policy mix. While fiscal authorities push for revenue mobilization through export duties, sectoral regulators simultaneously restrict output to stabilize prices. Rather than a fully coherent strategy, the current approach reflects an unresolved tension between short-term fiscal pressures and longer-term industrial and market considerations.
This tension becomes even more apparent when compared with the government’s more assertive stance in the nickel sector. The government is currently formulating an export duty on nickel-based products, particularly nickel pig iron (NPI), although the exact tariff structure and rates remain under deliberation. At the same time, supply-side controls have been introduced, with the nickel ore RKAB capped at around 150 million tonnes to safeguard domestic availability.
