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The relationship between the United States and China is often described as a contest for global supremacy. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, biotechnology, medicine, manufacturing, energy, and national security have all become arenas of intense competition.

But there is a contradiction at the center of this rivalry: America and China are competing inside a system in which they remain deeply interconnected.

That makes the emerging U.S.-China confrontation fundamentally different from the Cold War.

In his September 2026 Washington Post column, Fareed Zakaria argues that decades of globalization have created extensive connections between the two economies. Supply chains, technology, capital, research, manufacturing, and markets have developed together to such an extent that completely separating them could carry enormous economic consequences.

The important question, therefore, may not be whether the United States and China can defeat one another economically.

It may be whether they can compete and coexist without damaging the systems on which both depend.

Technology Reveals the U.S.-China Paradox

Nowhere is this contradiction clearer than in technology.

Washington increasingly regards advanced technologies—including artificial intelligence and semiconductors—as national-security assets. China, meanwhile, is investing aggressively in AI, robotics, advanced manufacturing, clean energy, batteries, and other technologies it believes will shape the global economy.

This has encouraged both countries to reduce vulnerabilities.

The United States has restricted Chinese access to certain advanced semiconductor technologies, while China has strengthened its domestic technology capabilities and exercised control over strategically important materials.

Yet technological competition does not necessarily produce technological independence.

Modern innovation operates through international networks of researchers, manufacturers, suppliers, investors, software developers, universities, and customers. Attempting to divide this ecosystem into completely separate American and Chinese spheres could therefore create new costs even as it reduces certain security risks.

The challenge is determining which technological connections create dangerous dependencies and which create mutually beneficial economic value.

Medicine Shows How Deep the Relationship Goes

Pharmaceuticals provide an even more immediate example.

According to figures highlighted by Zakaria, roughly 41% of the key starting materials used in U.S.-approved medicines are solely sourced from China. He also cites FDA data showing that only about 9% of manufacturers supplying key pharmaceutical ingredients to the U.S. market were domestic, compared with approximately 22% in China and 44% in India.

These numbers illustrate an uncomfortable reality.

A geopolitical conflict involving China would not remain confined to diplomacy, tariffs, smartphones, or computer chips. Disruptions could eventually reach products directly connected to Americans’ everyday health.

That does not mean dependence should simply be accepted.

Critical medical supply chains deserve diversification precisely because excessive dependence on any single country creates vulnerability.

But diversification is different from complete economic separation.

The goal could be to develop additional sources of essential medicines and pharmaceutical ingredients while preserving international trade where it remains beneficial and secure.

Decoupling vs. De-Risking

This distinction is becoming increasingly important.

Decoupling implies substantially separating the U.S. and Chinese economies.

De-risking means identifying areas where dependence creates serious national-security or economic vulnerabilities and developing alternatives.

The second strategy acknowledges something the first can overlook: not every economic connection represents the same level of risk.

Advanced military technologies deserve different safeguards than consumer products. Critical medicines deserve different treatment from ordinary manufactured goods. Semiconductor supply chains may require stronger protections than industries where multiple alternative suppliers already exist.

A sustainable U.S.-China strategy therefore requires something more sophisticated than simply asking whether America should trade with China.

Policymakers must ask:

Where is dependence dangerous?

Where should supply chains be diversified?

Where should domestic production be strengthened?

And where does continued cooperation benefit both countries without creating unacceptable security risks?

From Interdependence to “Managed Interdependence”

Zakaria describes a possible middle ground as “managed interdependence.”

The concept rejects two extreme assumptions.

The first is the old globalization-era belief that economic integration would automatically eliminate geopolitical conflict.

Clearly, it did not.

The second is the emerging belief that geopolitical rivalry means economic connections between competitors must therefore disappear.

That may be equally unrealistic.

Managed interdependence instead recognizes that the United States and China can simultaneously be competitors, customers, suppliers, innovators, and strategic rivals.

Under such a framework, both countries would protect genuinely sensitive technologies and diversify critical supply chains while maintaining commercial and scientific connections that do not pose unacceptable security risks.

AI Could Make Separation Even More Complicated

Artificial intelligence adds another dimension to the relationship.

The United States remains home to many leading AI companies and research institutions, while China is rapidly developing its own AI ecosystem and emphasizing widespread industrial adoption.

Zakaria has previously noted that China’s AI strategy places significant emphasis on applying existing AI capabilities throughout industries such as logistics, health care, robotics, drones, and smart cities.

That competition could accelerate innovation on both sides.

But restrictions can also produce unintended consequences.

When one country blocks another from accessing strategically important technologies, the targeted country has a powerful incentive to develop domestic alternatives.

Competition can therefore weaken a rival in the short term while simultaneously encouraging that rival to become more technologically self-sufficient over the long term.

That is one reason U.S.-China technology policy requires careful distinctions between genuine security protections and restrictions whose economic consequences may outweigh their strategic benefits.

Coexistence Does Not Mean Friendship

The United States and China do not need to become political allies for coexistence to work.

Their governments disagree over security, trade, technology, political systems, Taiwan, military power, and the future of the international order.

Those disagreements are substantial.

But economic coexistence does not require political agreement.

Countries routinely cooperate in areas where their interests overlap while competing intensely elsewhere.

For Washington and Beijing, the objective may therefore be less about eliminating rivalry and more about preventing rivalry in one sector from automatically destroying cooperation in every other sector.

A semiconductor dispute should not necessarily become a pharmaceutical crisis.

A disagreement over AI should not automatically disrupt ordinary consumer trade.

And a military confrontation should not be allowed to emerge accidentally from an economic dispute.

Building boundaries between these areas could become one of the most important challenges in U.S.-China relations.

Coexistence or Co-Destruction?

The biggest danger may be treating interdependence itself as weakness.

After four decades of globalization, neither the United States nor China operates in economic isolation. Their industries exist inside a much larger international network involving Europe, India, Southeast Asia, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, and dozens of other economies.

Trying to dismantle that system completely would not simply affect Washington and Beijing.

It could reshape global technology, medicine, manufacturing, investment, and trade.

Aerospace Industry Looks Beyond China for Critical Materials

The global aerospace industry is exploring new ways to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare-earth materials as supply disruptions and rising costs create challenges for manufacturers.

In a significant development, aerospace suppliers are revisiting decades-old technologies to develop alternatives to rare-earth-based materials used in jet engines and other critical components.

According to a September 21, 2026, Reuters report, manufacturers and researchers are investigating alternative ceramic coatings, recycling technologies, and material substitution strategies to address growing concerns about the availability of critical minerals.

The development highlights a broader shift in aerospace manufacturing: supply chain resilience is becoming an increasingly important consideration in materials research and industrial innovation.

Why China’s Rare-Earth Dominance Matters to Aerospace

China occupies a dominant position in the global rare-earth supply chain, particularly in the processing and production of materials essential to advanced manufacturing.

Rare-earth elements are used in numerous aerospace and defense applications, including high-performance magnets, electronic systems, and specialized coatings.

One particularly important material is yttrium, which is used in thermal barrier coatings that protect jet engine components from extreme temperatures.

These coatings help engines operate efficiently while protecting critical components from heat-related damage.

However, dependence on a concentrated supply chain creates vulnerabilities for manufacturers.

Export restrictions, geopolitical tensions, and material shortages can increase production costs, complicate procurement, and potentially disrupt manufacturing schedules.

For aerospace companies, where components must meet strict performance and safety requirements, finding suitable replacement materials is particularly challenging.

This is encouraging manufacturers to investigate alternatives that could reduce their exposure to supply disruptions without compromising technical performance.

Can 50-Year-Old Technology Replace Modern Rare-Earth Coatings?

One of the most interesting developments is the renewed interest in ceramic coating technologies originally developed during the 1970s and 1980s.

The National Research Council of Canada (NRC), working with industry partners, is evaluating whether zirconium dioxide and other non-rare-earth ceramic oxides could provide alternatives to modern rare-earth-based thermal barrier coatings.

These older materials were previously superseded by more advanced coating technologies.

However, improvements in materials science, engineering, and manufacturing techniques may create opportunities to enhance their performance.

The research raises an important question: Could modern engineering make older materials commercially relevant again?

If successful, such technologies could provide aerospace manufacturers with additional material options and reduce their dependence on certain critical minerals.

Nevertheless, developing a technically viable alternative does not automatically make it suitable for commercial aerospace applications.

New materials must undergo extensive testing and qualification before they can be incorporated into critical engine components.

Aerospace Suppliers Develop Rare-Earth-Free Coatings

Research into alternative materials is not limited to government laboratories.

European thermal coating manufacturer Oerlikon Metco is developing rare-earth-free products, including zirconia-based thermal barrier coatings incorporating magnesium and calcium oxides.

The company already offers certain rare-earth-free coating products, demonstrating that alternatives are available for some applications.

Meanwhile, suppliers in the United States are investigating non-rare-earth materials for less critical aerospace components.

Recycling surplus coating materials is another approach being explored to help ease supply constraints.

Together, these developments suggest that manufacturers are pursuing several complementary strategies rather than relying on a single technological solution.

The long-term opportunity extends beyond replacing individual materials.

Developing alternative coatings could encourage further innovation in manufacturing processes, materials engineering, and resource efficiency.

Why Replacing Rare Earths in Jet Engines Is Difficult

Although alternative materials offer potential benefits, replacing rare-earth-based coatings in aerospace applications presents significant technical challenges.

Jet engines operate under extreme conditions, making material performance and reliability essential.

Any replacement coating must demonstrate that it can withstand high temperatures, repeated heating and cooling, and prolonged operational stress.

Manufacturers must also consider compatibility with existing engine designs, production processes, and maintenance requirements.

Even when a promising alternative is identified, extensive testing and certification may be necessary before commercial adoption.

Consequently, rare-earth-free materials are unlikely to eliminate the aerospace industry’s dependence on Chinese supplies in the immediate future.

Industry experts cited by Reuters expect meaningful reductions in that dependence to take years rather than months.

What Rare-Earth Alternatives Mean for Global Supply Chains

The aerospace industry’s search for alternative materials reflects a broader challenge facing advanced manufacturing.

For decades, manufacturers have prioritized materials that offer the required combination of performance, reliability, and cost.

Increasingly, companies must also consider whether those materials will remain available during periods of geopolitical uncertainty.

This creates opportunities for several approaches to supply chain resilience.

Material substitution: Developing alternative materials can reduce dependence on specific minerals and concentrated supply chains.

Supply diversification: Establishing relationships with suppliers across different regions can reduce exposure to disruptions affecting individual countries.

Recycling and resource efficiency: Recovering valuable materials from manufacturing waste can help reduce demand for newly sourced raw materials.

Manufacturing innovation: Advances in engineering may allow companies to improve existing technologies or redesign components around more readily available materials.

These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Combining them could help manufacturers build more resilient supply chains while maintaining the performance requirements of critical aerospace systems.

However, each approach involves technical, economic, and operational trade-offs that companies must evaluate carefully.

The Future of Rare-Earth Alternatives in Aerospace

The search for rare-earth alternatives represents an important development in aerospace materials research.

By revisiting established technologies and developing new coating solutions, manufacturers are exploring ways to reduce their exposure to concentrated critical mineral supply chains.

While these efforts are unlikely to eliminate dependence on China in the near term, they could gradually expand the range of materials available to aerospace manufacturers.

The broader lesson extends beyond aviation.

As global supply chains face increasing uncertainty, the ability to develop, qualify, and commercialize alternative materials may become an important source of industrial resilience.

For aerospace manufacturers, the future may depend not only on developing more advanced materials but also on ensuring that those materials can be sourced reliably.