India’s electric vehicle (EV) market is gaining traction as rising fuel prices, regulatory changes, and expanding model offerings encourage more consumers to switch from conventional vehicles.
Electric car sales rose 25% in the year ending March 2026, with EVs surpassing 5% of India’s passenger vehicle market—a key milestone often viewed as the threshold for mainstream adoption. Growth has been strongest in vehicles priced above ₹1 million, where EVs now account for one in every ten sales.
The recent surge in crude oil prices, driven in part by tensions in the Middle East, has strengthened the economic case for EVs. India imports nearly 90% of its oil requirements, making it vulnerable to global energy price fluctuations. Higher fuel costs have prompted increased consumer interest in electric mobility.
Long-term policy support is also expected to drive adoption. Proposed CAFE-3 emission standards, scheduled to take effect from April 2027, would significantly tighten fuel-efficiency and carbon-emission requirements for automakers. Industry analysts believe the new regulations could accelerate EV penetration by making compliance targets more stringent and enforceable.
State governments are also pushing the transition. Delhi has proposed phasing out registrations of new internal combustion engine (ICE) two- and three-wheelers by 2027 as part of efforts to reduce air pollution.
Analysts expect further growth to be supported by a strong pipeline of new EV launches, particularly in the passenger vehicle and two-wheeler segments. Nomura forecasts EV penetration in India’s passenger vehicle market could reach 9% by 2030.
Despite the positive outlook, significant challenges remain. Charging infrastructure continues to lag demand, with public charging stations increasing to more than 10,000 nationwide but remaining concentrated in a few states. Consumer concerns over charging availability and driving range continue to slow adoption.
India also remains heavily dependent on imported battery materials and rare earth elements, exposing the sector to supply-chain and geopolitical risks. Industry experts note that developing a fully integrated domestic EV supply chain could take more than a decade.
While rising fuel prices and supportive policies are boosting demand, industry observers say the pace of India’s EV transition will ultimately depend on regulatory certainty, infrastructure expansion, and stronger domestic manufacturing capabilities.
This version is structured in a concise business-news style, focusing on market trends, drivers, forecasts, and risks rather than narrative storytelling.
NEW DELHI: India’s Ministry of Mines is expected to soon introduce an incentive policy aimed at boosting domestic processing of lithium and nickel, with a proposed outlay of approximately ₹3,000 crore (US$313.48 million), according to two sources familiar with the development.
The sources requested anonymity as they were not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. The Ministry of Mines did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.
Reuters had reported in January that the planned incentive scheme would focus on lithium and nickel processing. In April, the Mines Secretary stated that the government had shortlisted two critical minerals for a processing policy designed to strengthen the electric vehicle (EV) value chain, though the specific minerals were not disclosed at the time.
Lithium and nickel are key components in EV batteries and are considered vital to India’s clean mobility ambitions. The government aims to increase electric vehicle adoption to 30% of passenger car sales and 80% of two-wheeler sales by 2030, up from the current levels of 6% and 9%, respectively.
Under the proposed policy, lithium processing facilities would be required to have a minimum annual capacity of 30,000 metric tonnes, while nickel processing plants would need a minimum capacity of 50,000 metric tonnes to qualify for incentives, Reuters previously reported.
SEOUL: South Korea’s exports grew more than expected in May at the strongest annual rate in more than four decades, as chip sales hit a record on a global boom in AI investment, bolstering optimism about the trade-reliant economy and its world-beating stock market rally.
Exports from Asia’s fourth-largest economy, a bellwether for global trade, rose 53.2% from a year earlier to a record high of $87.75 billion, preliminary trade data showed on Monday, exceeding the median 48.4% increase forecast in a Reuters poll.
It was the 12th consecutive month of exports growing on a year-on-year basis and the biggest percentage rise since January 1984, bringing a record monthly trade surplus for the country.
“It is truly an unprecedented pace, raising market expectations again and again and exceeding them again and again,” said Stephen Lee, an economist at Meritz Securities in Seoul.
When the world talks about rare earths, the conversation usually centers on mines, supply chains, and geopolitics. Governments in Washington, Brussels, Canberra, and Tokyo are investing billions to reduce dependence on China for these critical minerals, which are essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, advanced electronics, and military systems.
But while Western policymakers focus on extracting more rare earths from the ground, China has spent decades investing in something much harder to replicate: people.
In the northern Chinese city of Baotou, often called the country’s rare earth capital, a sophisticated ecosystem of universities, research institutes, laboratories, and industrial facilities has created a steady pipeline of highly specialized talent. This workforce may be China’s most durable advantage in the global competition for critical minerals.
Building a Rare Earth Talent Factory
Each year, hundreds of students enroll in specialized rare earth programs at institutions such as the Inner Mongolia University of Science and Technology. Unlike traditional mining degrees found elsewhere in the world, these programs focus specifically on the science, engineering, and processing of rare earth elements.
Graduates can move directly into nearby refining facilities, magnet manufacturing plants, or advanced research institutes. In Baotou, the distance between classroom, laboratory, and factory can be measured in kilometers rather than continents.
This tight integration between education and industry has produced a workforce capable of contributing immediately upon graduation. Industry veterans who have worked in both China and the West often note that Chinese graduates arrive with practical knowledge tailored to rare earth production, while workers elsewhere may require years of additional training.
Why Rare Earths Are So Difficult
The challenge isn’t finding rare earths. These elements are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust.
The real difficulty lies in processing them.
Rare earth refining involves separating 17 chemically similar elements, a complex and costly process requiring advanced expertise in chemistry, metallurgy, and engineering. Producing materials such as neodymium and praseodymium—critical ingredients in high-performance magnets—requires intricate sequences of chemical treatments and separations.
Success depends not only on equipment and capital but also on decades of accumulated technical knowledge.
That expertise has become one of China’s most valuable strategic assets.
A Nationwide Research Network
China’s rare earth dominance is supported by an extensive research infrastructure.
The country hosts more than 40 dedicated rare earth laboratories and research institutes, many located near major mining regions. Universities, state-owned enterprises, and government-funded research centers collaborate closely, accelerating the transfer of new discoveries from laboratory experiments to industrial-scale production.
This model allows innovations to move rapidly through the development pipeline. Researchers develop new processing technologies, which can then be adopted by state-backed producers and scaled up for commercial use.
The result is a level of coordination that few countries have been able to match.
The West’s Lost Expertise
For much of the twentieth century, the United States and Europe led the world in rare earth processing.
That leadership gradually disappeared as environmental concerns, lower costs overseas, and shifting industrial priorities pushed much of the industry to China. As refining capacity moved abroad, educational programs and specialized expertise followed.
Today, relatively few Western universities offer dedicated rare earth programs. While institutions such as Ames National Laboratory in Iowa maintain strong research capabilities, the broader educational ecosystem remains limited compared with China’s.
The challenge is not simply building new mines or processing facilities. It is rebuilding a generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians with highly specialized skills.
That process can take decades.
The Geopolitical Stakes
Rare earths sit at the intersection of economic competitiveness and national security.
Advanced fighter aircraft, missile guidance systems, submarines, radar equipment, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies all depend on materials refined using rare earth processing expertise.
As tensions between China and the United States continue, Beijing’s control over more than 90% of global rare earth processing and magnet production gives it significant leverage in global supply chains.
Recent export restrictions and tighter controls on technology transfer suggest that China increasingly views rare earth expertise as a strategic resource that must be protected, much like advanced semiconductor technologies.
For policymakers in the West, this raises a difficult question: Can billions of dollars in investment recreate a talent ecosystem that China has spent decades building?
The Road Ahead
The race for rare earth independence is often portrayed as a battle over mines and factories. In reality, it is equally a competition for knowledge.
China’s dominance did not emerge overnight. It was built through long-term investment in education, research, industrial policy, and workforce development. Mines can be developed relatively quickly, and factories can be constructed within a few years. Building generations of specialists, however, requires patience and sustained commitment.
As countries seek to diversify supply chains and secure access to critical minerals, they may discover that the most valuable rare earth resource is not buried underground at all.
It is the expertise required to turn those minerals into the technologies that power the modern world.
The University of Edinburgh has licensed a gold and copper recovery process to mineral processing company Lithium Universe, enabling cleaner extraction of high‑value metals from electronic waste.
Developed by Professors Jason Love and Carole Morrison in the School of Chemistry, and commercialized with support from Edinburgh Innovations, the Gold Copper Diamide Extraction (GCDE) process uses organic compounds to selectively extract metals from discarded electronics.
Under an exclusive agreement, Lithium Universe will deploy and sub‑license the technology globally as part of its expanding precious metals recycling strategy.
E‑waste is one of the world’s fastest-growing hazardous waste streams, projected to reach around 93.5 million tonnes by 2030, but only about 20% is recycled using environmentally sound methods, the University said.
This waste is valuable, as devices and printed circuit boards are rich in gold and copper. At current prices, the gold content of one tonne of typical e‑waste is worth more than $46,000, with copper adding roughly another $2,000, it estimates.
But traditional e‑waste processing relies on furnace smelting above 1,200°C or aggressive leaching, both energy‑intensive and polluting, the University noted. Its GCDE process instead uses low‑temperature hydrometallurgy and small, reusable organic ligands to target metals in sequence, under mild conditions and avoiding cyanide, mercury and organic solvent extraction.
“Electronic waste is effectively a high‑grade ‘urban ore’. Our goal was to design chemistry that can recover those metals selectively and safely, without the energy and environmental cost of smelting,” Love said in a news release.
“The diamide behaves like a molecular magnet for gold. By following with a selective copper step, we can recover two of the most valuable metals in e‑waste with high purity and lower environmental impact.”
Lithium Universe plans to integrate GCDE into its precious metals recycling division, alongside its silver recovery technologies for end‑of‑life solar panels.
“This breakthrough from the University of Edinburgh reinforces the strategic expansion of our precious metals recycling division into high-value recovery technologies,” executive chair Iggy Tan said. By integrating selective metal recovery with sustainable processing, the company would “strengthen its competitive position in circular-economy solutions for gold, silver and copper recovery,” he added.
Bridge Green Launches Critical Mineral Recovery Plant in Chennai to Advance Battery Circularity
In a significant step toward building a circular battery economy, US-based startup Bridge Green Upcycle has inaugurated a state-of-the-art critical mineral recovery facility in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India.
Strengthening India’s Battery Recycling Ecosystem
Located in Gummidipoondi near Chennai, the newly commissioned plant is designed to process end-of-life lithium-ion batteries as well as battery manufacturing scrap. With an annual processing capacity of 7,200 tonnes, the facility represents one of the most advanced battery recycling operations in the region.
The plant will recover a range of critical minerals, including:
Lithium
Cobalt
Nickel
Manganese
Copper
Graphite
These materials play a vital role in battery manufacturing and are essential for supporting the growing electric vehicle (EV) and energy storage industries.
Recognition Under Government Incentive Scheme
The facility has been selected under the Government of India’s Critical Mineral Recycling Incentive Scheme, highlighting its strategic importance in strengthening domestic supply chains for critical raw materials. Notably, it is the only facility in Tamil Nadu included in the first cohort of projects approved under the initiative.
Major Investment Plans Ahead
Bridge Green’s Founder and CEO announced that the company plans to invest between ₹500 crore and ₹1,000 crore over the next five years. The current plant is expected to ramp up operations and reach full processing capacity by the end of this year.
This investment underscores the company’s long-term commitment to developing a sustainable and localized critical minerals ecosystem in India.
Expanding into Refined Battery Materials
Beyond mineral recovery, Bridge Green has outlined ambitious expansion plans. The next phase of development will focus on producing refined battery-grade materials, including:
Lithium carbonate
Nickel sulfate
Manganese sulfate
Cobalt sulfate
The company is targeting commissioning of these facilities by the end of 2028. Additionally, plans are underway to establish a second-life battery plant, further extending the lifecycle of battery assets and reducing waste.
Supporting the Circular Economy
As demand for batteries continues to grow worldwide, recycling and material recovery will play an increasingly important role in reducing dependence on virgin mining and improving resource security. Facilities such as Bridge Green’s Chennai plant demonstrate how innovative recycling technologies can help create a more sustainable, resilient, and circular battery value chain.
The launch marks an important milestone not only for Bridge Green but also for India’s emerging critical minerals and battery recycling sector, positioning the country as a key player in the global energy transition.
A key differentiator for Bridge Green is its proprietary technology platform focused on both battery life extension and critical mineral extraction. By combining advanced recycling processes with second-life battery solutions, the company aims to maximize resource utilization while reducing environmental impact.
The company’s strategy extends beyond recycling alone. Bridge Green plans to serve both domestic and international markets, supplying recovered minerals and battery materials to industries including battery manufacturing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, defence, and aerospace.
In addition to mineral recovery, the company intends to provide second-life battery systems for data centres and industrial users. These systems can repurpose batteries that are no longer suitable for electric vehicles but still retain sufficient capacity for stationary energy storage applications, further supporting circular economy objectives.
Capitalizing on Growing Demand
According to Founder and CEO demand for battery-grade materials already exists in India and is expected to grow significantly as the country’s cell manufacturing ecosystem matures. As domestic battery production expands under various government initiatives, the need for locally sourced critical minerals and refined battery salts will become increasingly important.
Bridge Green is also positioning itself to tap into international opportunities. Potential export markets include the United States, Southeast Asia, and Europe—regions that are rapidly strengthening their battery supply chains and seeking reliable sources of critical minerals.
The recently established US–India Critical Minerals Supply Chain Framework presents an additional opportunity for the company. As a US–India enterprise, Bridge Green is uniquely positioned to support cross-border collaboration in securing sustainable supplies of critical materials required for the global energy transition.
Pip: Welcome to a show about the rocks that run the world — or at least the ones that run the drones, the defense contracts, and the supply chains holding everything together.
Mara: Today we're looking at work from Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng, and it lands squarely in rare earth territory — specifically who controls the magnets inside American military drones, and what one company is doing about it.
Pip: Let's start with the Pentagon's drone ambitions and the supply chain problem underneath them.
The Pentagon's Drone Ambitions vs. China's Magnet Grip
Mara: The setup here is stark: the United States military wants a lot of drones, fast, and almost every one of them depends on a component it doesn't control.
Pip: The post puts the numbers plainly: "The Pentagon recently placed the largest drone order in American history — 30,000 one-way attack drones, with plans to scale past 300,000 by early 2028."
Mara: And the constraint hiding inside that ambition is the rare earth magnet. According to Goldman Sachs figures cited in the post, roughly 98 percent of the world's magnets are manufactured in China. So the upshot is: you can order all the drones you want, but if the magnets aren't there, the drones aren't either.
Pip: Three hundred thousand drones is a serious procurement target. The magnet math is the part that doesn't scale with good intentions.
Mara: That's where REalloys enters the picture. The post describes the company as holding the only fully non-Chinese mine-to-magnet heavy rare earth supply chain in North America — covering processed metals, finished alloys, and the magnet-ready inputs that defense contractors actually need.
Pip: So the chain runs from the ground to the finished input, entirely outside China. That's the gap REalloys is positioned to fill, and it's a gap the Pentagon's own order just made very visible.
Mara: The original reporting is sourced to The Globe and Mail, and the post frames REalloys not as a speculative play but as a company that has spent years building toward exactly this moment in defense procurement.
Pip: The timing is either very good planning or very good luck — probably some of both.
Mara: Rare earth supply chains don't move fast, but defense procurement deadlines do. That tension is what makes this story worth watching.
Pip: The magnets are small. The stakes are not. More next time.
Pip: Welcome to the blog where the earth gives up its metals, its minerals, and apparently its trade policy opinions — this is A Blog for Browsing Mining, Mineral Processing, and Metals Info.
Mara: Today’s episode comes from Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng, and it covers a significant shift in how China and Africa are structuring their trade relationship — and what that might mean for African industry.
Pip: Let’s start with the zero-tariff expansion and what it actually unlocks for African exporters.
China Opens Its Market to All of Africa
Pip: The core question here is whether a tariff policy can do more than just move goods — whether it can actually reshape what African economies produce and how they fit into global supply chains.
Mara: The post frames the stakes clearly from the outset: “China has expanded its zero-tariff policy to include all 53 African nations with which it maintains diplomatic relations, opening new opportunities for African exports and industrial development at a time when global trade is increasingly affected by protectionist policies.”
Pip: So the timing is the thing. While other major economies are pulling up the drawbridge, this policy is explicitly moving the other direction — and that contrast is the whole story.
Mara: The numbers back that up. Bilateral trade between China and Africa hit a record 348 billion US dollars in 2025. Chinese imports from Africa reached 123 billion, with year-on-year growth of 5.4 percent. The policy took effect immediately — a shipment of 24 tonnes of South African apples was the first to clear customs under the new arrangement, in Shenzhen.
Pip: Twenty-four tonnes of apples as the symbolic opening act of a continental trade realignment. History is rarely glamorous.
Mara: Previously, tariff-free access applied to 33 of Africa’s least-developed countries. The expansion adds 20 more economies — Kenya, Egypt, and Nigeria among them — covering products like Kenyan coffee and avocados, cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, and South African citrus and wine, which had faced tariffs of 8 to 30 percent.
Mara: Scholars from Tsinghua University and the University of International Business and Economics argue the real prize is what follows: tariff-free access could pull manufacturing and processing investment into Africa, helping the continent move beyond raw material exports toward finished goods.
Pip: That shift — from digging it up to actually processing it — is exactly the kind of industrial development this blog exists to track.
Mara: The arrangement runs for an initial two-year period while longer-term agreements are developed under the China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development framework. African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf called the move timely and described it as a gesture of solidarity.
Pip: Trade policy as solidarity — a framing worth sitting with, whatever you make of it.
Pip: Raw materials leaving a continent, finished goods coming back — that gap is where industrialization either happens or doesn’t.
Mara: Whether the investment follows the tariff relief is the question the next few years will answer. We’ll be watching.
China has expanded its zero-tariff policy to include all 53 African nations with which it maintains diplomatic relations, opening new opportunities for African exports and industrial development at a time when global trade is increasingly affected by protectionist policies.
The policy took effect immediately, with a shipment of 24 tonnes of South African apples becoming the first African products to enter China under the expanded tariff-free arrangement after clearing customs in Shenzhen.
Previously, China had already eliminated tariffs on all product categories from 33 of Africa’s least-developed countries starting December 2024. The latest expansion extends similar benefits to 20 additional African economies, including Kenya, Egypt, and Nigeria. Under the arrangement, these countries will enjoy preferential zero-tariff access for an initial two-year period while China works toward establishing long-term trade agreements through the China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development framework.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, the measure will improve the competitiveness of African exports such as cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Kenyan coffee and avocados, and South African citrus fruits and wine, which previously faced tariffs ranging from 8% to 30%. The ministry also believes the initiative will encourage greater investment in Africa by attracting capital, technology, equipment, and management expertise to support local processing industries. This, in turn, is expected to create a more balanced and sustainable trade relationship between China and Africa.
The decision has been widely welcomed as a strong signal of China’s commitment to economic openness during a period when many countries are adopting more restrictive trade policies. African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf described the move as both timely and beneficial for Africa, noting that the continent continues to face numerous global challenges, including rising protectionism. He expressed appreciation for what he called a gesture of solidarity from China.
China remains Africa’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade reached a record US$348 billion in 2025, with Chinese imports from Africa totaling US$123 billion, representing year-on-year growth of 5.4%.
Experts believe the impact of the policy will extend beyond trade. Scholars from institutions including Tsinghua University and University of International Business and Economics argue that tariff-free access could encourage multinational companies to establish manufacturing and processing facilities in Africa, supporting industrialization and helping the continent move beyond its traditional role as a supplier of raw materials.
The initiative also aligns with China’s broader economic strategy of expanding international openness and improving trade and investment cooperation through 2030. Analysts suggest that Chinese consumers will benefit as well, gaining access to a wider range of competitively priced African products. Businesses have already begun preparing to increase imports, including Kenyan tea processors that expect significantly lower costs under the new tariff regime.
Overall, the expanded zero-tariff policy is expected to strengthen China-Africa economic ties, boost African exports, attract investment, and support long-term industrial growth across the continent.
Pip: Welcome to the podcast where we dig into mining, mineral processing, and metals — sometimes literally. Today we're following the rare earth supply chain from California to the Arctic, courtesy of Nanthakumar Victor Emmanuel, P.Eng.
Mara: That's right — we're looking at why Greenland keeps coming up in rare earth conversations, and what the real obstacles are to building a Western supply chain that actually works.
Pip: Let's start with the Mountain Pass story, and why it matters more than the map suggests.
Why Greenland? The Mountain Pass lesson and what comes next
Mara: The central question here is why Western policymakers keep looking at Greenland when the United States already has a rare earth mine in California — and what that question reveals about the gap between mining and refining.
Pip: The post quotes a researcher named Chrisey to put the technical problem in plain terms: "Two different rare earth elements may be fractions of an angstrom different in diameter — that means it's very difficult to separate using physical means. The processes that are used right now can be 100 steps," with the procedure described as very expensive and environmentally hazardous due to the chemicals used.
Mara: So the upshot is that even if you have the ore in the ground, separating and purifying individual rare earth elements is a genuinely hard chemical problem — not just a permitting or investment problem.
Pip: Mountain Pass is the case study. Molycorp tried to be a one-stop American rare earths solution, and by 2013 revenues were in free fall. The post notes that Molycorp's most profitable assets ended up transferred to Chinese-linked Neo Materials, the mine was purchased out of bankruptcy by a consortium that included a Chinese-owned firm, and Mountain Pass was sending U.S.-mined concentrate to China for processing.
Mara: The dream of domestic end-to-end production collapsed not because the ore ran out, but because the refining technology and economics didn't hold. The post cites Reuters reporting that China controls 87 percent of global rare earths refining capacity, and that Beijing deliberately keeps prices for finished products low to inhibit foreign competition from building their own processing plants.
Pip: It's a neat trap — dig all you want, just send us the concentrate.
Mara: The post lays out a three-step prescription in response: invest in research and development on refining technologies first, build refineries at existing mines with infrastructure before opening new ones, and use tariffs or other tools to take price control away from China while local operations optimize. The reserve numbers matter here too — Greenland has 1.5 million metric tons of rare earth reserves, while the U.S. sits at 1.9 million. Neither country is close to China's 44 million metric tons.
Pip: Which reframes the Greenland question entirely — it's not about the ore, it's about whether Western refining can exist at all before anyone starts a new mine.
Mara: Exactly the argument the post makes. The infrastructure and processing capability have to come before the next frontier dig, or the concentrate just travels east again.
Pip: The economics of refining are where the real supply chain battle is being fought — and that's a thread worth pulling on next.
Mara: The Mountain Pass story keeps repeating because the refining problem keeps being skipped.
Pip: Build the refinery first, then talk about Greenland. That order matters.