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Gecamines is set to sell nearly half of Kamoto Copper Co.’s (KCC) copper output over the next two years, with an option to market 30% of production in subsequent years. This arrangement aligns with similar agreements Gecamines has formed with other major Congolese mines, where it maintains a minority stake.

In a significant development, Glencore PLC has agreed to sell a 40% share in its Democratic Republic of Congo copper and cobalt assets to the US-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium for approximately $9 billion, including debt. This transaction encompasses Glencore’s Mutanda Mining (Mumi) and Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) assets, which are among the leading Western-owned cobalt and copper producers in the DRC.

Additionally, the consortium has the option to sell its share of output to designated purchasers, while Glencore will continue to manage the daily operations of the mines.

This agreement underscores Washington’s increasing concern regarding supply chain risks, particularly its dependence on China for essential minerals utilized in renewable energy, electric vehicles, and defense technology.

Source: https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/the-drc-bets-big-on-copper-to-boost-global-influence-with-a-landmark-mining-deal/vkqdd39

Vale SA agreed to sell most of its stake in a Canadian nickel venture to Exiro Minerals Corp., Orion Resource Partners LP and Canada Growth Fund Inc. as part of an optimization of its metals business.

The Brazilian iron ore miner’s Vale Base Metals unit signed an agreement to create a new consortium of owners for the Thompson Nickel Belt operations in Manitoba, it said in a statement Thursday. Exiro, Orion and CGF will own about 81% of the new company, with Vale retaining 19%.

The consortium partners will form a new company called Exiro Nickel Company and committed to investing as much as $200 million at Thompson. Vale Base Metals signed an offtake agreement for concentrate produced at the Thompson Mill, thereby maintaining its status as Canada’s top nickel supplier.

Read more at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-19/vale-to-yield-control-of-canada-nickel-assets-in-metals-shakeup

Indonesia has been taking drastic steps to boost prices of its biggest export commodity, largely through scaling back volumes that key miners are allowed to produce. Before the latest round of cutbacks, supply from the country had risen to about two-thirds of global production, creating a surplus.

The country will issue production quotas of between 260 million and 270 million tons of nickel ore this year, Director General of Minerals and Coal Tri Winarno said. That’s slightly above a previous estimate of 250 million to 260 million tons, but well below the 379 million tons targeted in 2025.

Though higher than the earlier estimate, volumes below 270 million tons are still seen as bullish for prices, said Fan Jianyuan, an analyst with Shanghai-based consultancy Mysteel Global, adding that quota issuance should be completed by March.

Read more at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-11/nickel-extends-gains-as-indonesia-reaffirms-sharp-mining-cuts

President Evariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi has launched an ambitious move seeking enhanced cooperation with the United Arab Emirates.

During the World Governments Summit, Gen. Ndayishimiye was received by the President of the United Arab Emirates, HE Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

“They discussed issues of diplomatic and economic cooperation within a win-win partnership,” Burundi presidency said shortly after.

A highly isolated Burundi with it’s entire western frontier closed off due to frozen relations with Rwanda since 2015 and an ongoing war in DRC, Ndayishimiye badly needs to look beyond the border for new friends.

Burundi is considering securing investments into the country’s critical minerals sector.

Burundi’s critical mineral resources, particularly its rare earth elements, niobium, and tantalum, are positioned to play a significant role in the global energy transition.

These minerals are crucial for the production of renewable energy technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems.

Burundi’s rare earths and nickel deposits, still underexplored, have the potential to attract international investment and boost the country’s role in the mineral supply chain.

Read more at: https://taarifa.rw/index.php/2026/02/07/burundi-courts-uae-for-areas-of-cooperation/

Over the past decade, Indonesia has become the world’s largest processor of nickel, driven in large part by Chinese investment. Industrial estates expanded rapidly in Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia, driving an export boom. Indonesia moved closer to its goal of capturing more value from its mineral resources rather than exporting raw ore.

This outcome followed deliberate policy choices. Jakarta banned the export of unprocessed nickel, expedited permit approvals and promoted downstream processing as a national priority. Chinese firms responded with capital, engineering capacity and speed. The arrangement aligned mutual interests and reshaped global nickel supply.

This scale of investment now underscores the urgent need for robust governance to protect national interests.

Failure to enforce a core reporting obligation for years reveals a critical regulatory gap. If rules are not followed, institutional oversight breaks down and Indonesia’s authority over its strategic nickel sector is weakened.

The environmental implications are immediate. Nickel processing is energy-intensive and often relies on coal. Industrial expansion can increase deforestation, water stress, and flood risk if controls weaken. Central Sulawesi has already experienced environmental pressure around industrial zones. Effective monitoring depends on accurate, routine reporting.

Indonesia’s advantage lies not only in its nickel reserves but in its ability to govern them. Natural resources create opportunity; institutions determine outcomes.

The next phase of China-Indonesia economic cooperation will test that capacity. Industrial ambition has delivered rapid gains for Indonesia. Sustaining them will depend on disciplined enforcement, clear data and consistent oversight.

Read more at: https://asiatimes.com/2026/02/no-reports-no-records-chinas-nickel-black-hole-in-indonesia/

U.S. President Donald Trump is rolling out the red carpet for Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi this week, positioning the war-ravaged African country as a central pillar in his plan to expand U.S. ownership of critical minerals.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a major producer of copper and cobalt – two of the critical minerals that Mr. Trump is targeting for U.S. acquisitions.

A commercial deal to ensure U.S. access to Congo’s mineral resources was attached to the U.S.-led peace process between Congo and Rwanda this year. The agreement is the biggest mineral deal in U.S.-Africa history, Mr. Trump told a prayer-breakfast audience in Washington on Thursday.

China controls an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of copper and cobalt mining in Congo, but Mr. Trump seems determined to break into the sector in a big way.

Read more at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-us-pushes-for-bigger-slice-of-congos-mineral-resources/

Critical minerals are no longer just industrial inputs. They are now strategic assets treated by governments as both economic infrastructure and national security leverage. Critical minerals sit inside everyday objects like smartphones, hairdryers, vacuums, and electric vehicles, but also inside missile guidance systems and power grids.

U.S. law reflects that broadened view. The Energy Act of 2020 defines “critical minerals” as minerals or materials that are essential to U.S. economic or national security, have supply chains vulnerable to disruption, and perform an essential manufacturing function such as that their absence would carry significant consequences.

In practice, that definition is sweeping. anchor battery supply chains. Gallium and germanium support semiconductors and other high-tech uses. Rare earth elements such as neodymium and dysprosium underpin permanent magnets found in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and defense applications.

As companies diversify away from concentrated suppliers, a second-order risk emerges. Some alternative sources sit in higher-risk jurisdictions, where governance, labor, or conflict-linked concerns are more acute.

This is where “critical minerals” and “conflict minerals” begin to overlap in practice. Even when the commodity is available, shipments can be disrupted by forced-labor enforcement, sanctions exposure, or traceability requirements imposed by customers, regulators, or financiers. A sourcing shift meant to reduce geopolitical risk can accidentally import compliance risk.

What this means for companies

For importers, manufacturers, and downstream buyers, the near-term imperative is operational. It is to build a compliance-and-procurement posture that assumes volatility.

Practical steps include:

•Map exposure: Identify where critical minerals enter production, either directly or embedded through subcomponents.

•Classify and document early: For controlled inputs, assume licensing and end-use information will be required, and build documentation upstream with suppliers.

•Contract for delay: Treat licensing and customs holds as foreseeable risks and allocate them clearly in contracts.

•Diversify with diligence: Diversification plans should include conflict minerals/forced-labor screening and traceability, not just alternate countries of origin.

•Monitor policy signals: Lists, proclamations, and export controls notices are increasingly early warning systems for trade risk.

For U.S.-based processors and refiners, the new critical minerals objectives may allow for new opportunities, with the Administration’s focus on domestic capacity expansion creating favorable conditions for investment in U.S.-based processing and refining operations. Companies aligned with U.S. supply-chain security objectives may find enhanced opportunities for partnerships and government support.

Conclusion

Critical minerals have become trade’s hard currency. They are not just priced, but negotiated; not just mined, but regulated; and not just shipped, but screened.

For businesses, the lesson is that in the critical minerals economy, supply chains are no longer merely commercial. They are strategic, and trade policy is being built to match.

Read more at: https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/critical-minerals-licensing-tariffs-new-supply-chain-risk–pracin-2026-01-29/