The US has developed a critical minerals price floor system that it’s pitching to allies as the Trump administration and more than 50 countries look to reduce dependence on China for the resources that are deemed critical to national security.
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg said multiple US agencies have developed the system and are having conversations with allies and partners. It’s the latest update to progress being made by the US and its allies to ringfence Western companies from China’s pressure on those markets.
Premier nickel industry bodies of the Philippines and Indonesia have entered into a partnership to formalize a regional supply chain corridor, aiming to cement Southeast Asia’s dominance in the global energy transition.
The Philippine Nickel Industry Association (PNIA) signed a partnership agreement with the Asosiasi Penambang Nikel Indonesia (APNI), otherwise known as the Indonesia Nickel Miners Association, to outline the shared direction of both countries’ nickel mining industries.
Under the agreement, the PNIA and APNI sought to promote the IndoPhil Nickel Corridor, a unified platform designed to elevate the global significance of Indonesian and Philippine nickel.
The corridor is envisioned to build investment confidence, encourage policy dialogue, and promote responsible mining, especially as mineral resources are becoming the central component to the global energy transition.
“The corridor signals that Philippine and Indonesian nickel is developed with clearer standards and accountability,” PNIA Executive Director Charmaine Olea-Capili.
By bringing together industry leadership from PNIA and APNI, Olea-Capili said the initiative demonstrates that both the Philippines and Indonesia are committed to building a supply chain that other countries can rely on.
The Philippines is the second-largest producer of nickel in the world, trailing Indonesia. Combined, the two countries are estimated to account for around 75 percent of the global supply of the mineral.
Nickel plays a critical role in supporting strategic sectors such as energy, mobility, and infrastructure, as well as the green and digital transitions.
CAPE TOWN, Feb 12 (Reuters) – Two multi-billion dollar rail projects in Africa. One headed west, the other east. One backed by Western countries, the other by China. Both aiming to ship vast quantities of critical minerals. Welcome to the new scramble for Africa.
The Lobito rail corridor will cost up to $6 billion by the time it’s planned to be finished by 2030, with around 1,700 kilometres (1,050 miles) of track taking mainly copper and cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia west to the Angolan port of Lobito.
Much of the funding is coming from the United States and Europe and aims to upgrade the existing railway and build new lines in order to boost the annual capacity to 4.6 million metric tons per year.
Heading the other way east to Tanzania is the TAZARA railway, a 1,860 kilometer line that links the same mineral-rich parts of Zambia and the DRC to a port on the Indian Ocean, which offers shorter sailing times to China and other Asian markets.
Similar to the Lobito project it is a rehabilitation of an existing colonial-era railway and its Chinese backers are slated to spend around $1.4 billion to upgrade its annual capacity to 2.4 million tons.
These two projects are emblematic of how the world’s great powers are seeking to source and control the minerals needed to power industrial economies and the energy transition.
But they also show the contrasting ways that Western countries and China are trying to achieve their aims of security of supply.
Stuck in the middle are African countries, blessed by their resource endowment but cursed by a lack of coordinated policies on how to ensure they are not exploited by stronger nations, as well as too often being hobbled by poor governance and an inability to offer consistent and reliable investment regimes.
What is different this time compared to the colonial conquest of Africa two centuries ago is that African countries have far more choice.
They can set the rules and decide who they want to partner with, and if they get it correct then they stand to benefit from increased investment, jobs and revenue from taxes and royalties.
The models being offered are slightly different, insofar as the Western countries largely prefer private operators, coupled with public partnerships and funding in order to build mines and transport infrastructure.
U.S. WOOS
One of the major shifts at this week’s Mining Indaba conference in Cape Town was how the United States has changed tack, eschewing the bombastic and combative rhetoric of President Donald Trump and trying to focus on promoting trade and investment.
It is perhaps a tacit acknowledgement that insulting countries that you need for their resources is not a winning policy, but U.S. officials were out in force touting their capital for investment and their willingness to effectively re-risk mining projects by guaranteeing offtake and prices.
If the United States does go down this path, and African countries can look past the prior Trump insults and gutting of U.S. aid, there is a real possibility that new mines and infrastructure will proceed.
The planned U.S. “vault” of critical minerals will need African resources and a meeting of more than 50 countries last week shows the Trump administration appears to be serious about building and securing supplies of metals.
Will the efforts by the United States, and to a lesser extent the European Union, be enough to wean African states from Chinese investment, which has tended to be more all-encompassing as Chinese companies explore, build, operate and transport minerals.
An example is the massive Simandou iron ore mine in Guinea, currently ramping up to its 120 million tons a year capacity.
For years the project languished as Western companies struggled to mount a viable economic plan to make it work.
But Chinese investment and technical skill has brought the project to life, albeit with a minority partner in Rio Tinto and the ore from Simandou will flow almost entirely to China as a result.
The Chinese also have a strong first-mover advantage in Africa, having been active for decades.
But the question for African countries is whether China’s investment in extracting the continent’s minerals has been mutually beneficial, or whether it has been skewed towards Beijing.
The follow-up question is whether Western countries and their trading and mining companies will offer anything substantially better.
What is almost certain is that more investment is heading to exploit Africa’s mineral endowment, which will boost competition and de-risk projects.
Is the prize big enough to make everybody a winner? Yes, but it will take considerable effort and cooperation and the track record for that in Africa is patchy at best.
Indonesia has been taking drastic steps to boost prices of its biggest export commodity, largely through scaling back volumes that key miners are allowed to produce. Before the latest round of cutbacks, supply from the country had risen to about two-thirds of global production, creating a surplus.
The country will issue production quotas of between 260 million and 270 million tons of nickel ore this year, Director General of Minerals and Coal Tri Winarno said. That’s slightly above a previous estimate of 250 million to 260 million tons, but well below the 379 million tons targeted in 2025.
Though higher than the earlier estimate, volumes below 270 million tons are still seen as bullish for prices, said Fan Jianyuan, an analyst with Shanghai-based consultancy Mysteel Global, adding that quota issuance should be completed by March.
Democratic Republic of Congo will enforce a long-dormant rule requiring local employee ownership for mines in a move that may rebalance shareholdings in some of the world’s biggest copper and cobalt producers.
In a letter dated Jan. 30 and addressed to miners of all metals in the country, Mines Minister Louis Watum said firms must demonstrate that 5% of their share capital is held by Congolese employees.
The decision could affect multiple industrial mining projects in the central African nation, which provides about 70% of cobalt supply and is the second-largest copper producer. Glencore Plc, CMOC Group Ltd., Ivanhoe Mines Ltd., Eurasian Resources Group and Zijin Mining Group Co. are among the country’s biggest miners. Barrick Mining Corp. operates one of Africa’s largest gold mines in the country, which also has vast deposits of lithium, tantalum, tin and zinc.
The move comes amid ongoing negotiations between the Trump administration and Congo that could see more US companies invest in the country’s mining industry, which has previously been dominated by Chinese enterprises.
President Evariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi has launched an ambitious move seeking enhanced cooperation with the United Arab Emirates.
During the World Governments Summit, Gen. Ndayishimiye was received by the President of the United Arab Emirates, HE Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
“They discussed issues of diplomatic and economic cooperation within a win-win partnership,” Burundi presidency said shortly after.
A highly isolated Burundi with it’s entire western frontier closed off due to frozen relations with Rwanda since 2015 and an ongoing war in DRC, Ndayishimiye badly needs to look beyond the border for new friends.
Burundi is considering securing investments into the country’s critical minerals sector.
Burundi’s critical mineral resources, particularly its rare earth elements, niobium, and tantalum, are positioned to play a significant role in the global energy transition.
These minerals are crucial for the production of renewable energy technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems.
Burundi’s rare earths and nickel deposits, still underexplored, have the potential to attract international investment and boost the country’s role in the mineral supply chain.
Over the past decade, Indonesia has become the world’s largest processor of nickel, driven in large part by Chinese investment. Industrial estates expanded rapidly in Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia, driving an export boom. Indonesia moved closer to its goal of capturing more value from its mineral resources rather than exporting raw ore.
This outcome followed deliberate policy choices. Jakarta banned the export of unprocessed nickel, expedited permit approvals and promoted downstream processing as a national priority. Chinese firms responded with capital, engineering capacity and speed. The arrangement aligned mutual interests and reshaped global nickel supply.
This scale of investment now underscores the urgent need for robust governance to protect national interests.
Failure to enforce a core reporting obligation for years reveals a critical regulatory gap. If rules are not followed, institutional oversight breaks down and Indonesia’s authority over its strategic nickel sector is weakened.
The environmental implications are immediate. Nickel processing is energy-intensive and often relies on coal. Industrial expansion can increase deforestation, water stress, and flood risk if controls weaken. Central Sulawesi has already experienced environmental pressure around industrial zones. Effective monitoring depends on accurate, routine reporting.
Indonesia’s advantage lies not only in its nickel reserves but in its ability to govern them. Natural resources create opportunity; institutions determine outcomes.
The next phase of China-Indonesia economic cooperation will test that capacity. Industrial ambition has delivered rapid gains for Indonesia. Sustaining them will depend on disciplined enforcement, clear data and consistent oversight.
U.S. President Donald Trump is rolling out the red carpet for Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi this week, positioning the war-ravaged African country as a central pillar in his plan to expand U.S. ownership of critical minerals.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a major producer of copper and cobalt – two of the critical minerals that Mr. Trump is targeting for U.S. acquisitions.
A commercial deal to ensure U.S. access to Congo’s mineral resources was attached to the U.S.-led peace process between Congo and Rwanda this year. The agreement is the biggest mineral deal in U.S.-Africa history, Mr. Trump told a prayer-breakfast audience in Washington on Thursday.
China controls an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of copper and cobalt mining in Congo, but Mr. Trump seems determined to break into the sector in a big way.
Critical minerals are no longer just industrial inputs. They are now strategic assets treated by governments as both economic infrastructure and national security leverage. Critical minerals sit inside everyday objects like smartphones, hairdryers, vacuums, and electric vehicles, but also inside missile guidance systems and power grids.
U.S. law reflects that broadened view. The Energy Act of 2020 defines “critical minerals” as minerals or materials that are essential to U.S. economic or national security, have supply chains vulnerable to disruption, and perform an essential manufacturing function such as that their absence would carry significant consequences.
In practice, that definition is sweeping. anchor battery supply chains. Gallium and germanium support semiconductors and other high-tech uses. Rare earth elements such as neodymium and dysprosium underpin permanent magnets found in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and defense applications.
As companies diversify away from concentrated suppliers, a second-order risk emerges. Some alternative sources sit in higher-risk jurisdictions, where governance, labor, or conflict-linked concerns are more acute.
This is where “critical minerals” and “conflict minerals” begin to overlap in practice. Even when the commodity is available, shipments can be disrupted by forced-labor enforcement, sanctions exposure, or traceability requirements imposed by customers, regulators, or financiers. A sourcing shift meant to reduce geopolitical risk can accidentally import compliance risk.
What this means for companies
For importers, manufacturers, and downstream buyers, the near-term imperative is operational. It is to build a compliance-and-procurement posture that assumes volatility.
Practical steps include:
•Map exposure: Identify where critical minerals enter production, either directly or embedded through subcomponents.
•Classify and document early: For controlled inputs, assume licensing and end-use information will be required, and build documentation upstream with suppliers.
•Contract for delay: Treat licensing and customs holds as foreseeable risks and allocate them clearly in contracts.
•Diversify with diligence: Diversification plans should include conflict minerals/forced-labor screening and traceability, not just alternate countries of origin.
•Monitor policy signals: Lists, proclamations, and export controls notices are increasingly early warning systems for trade risk.
For U.S.-based processors and refiners, the new critical minerals objectives may allow for new opportunities, with the Administration’s focus on domestic capacity expansion creating favorable conditions for investment in U.S.-based processing and refining operations. Companies aligned with U.S. supply-chain security objectives may find enhanced opportunities for partnerships and government support.
Conclusion
Critical minerals have become trade’s hard currency. They are not just priced, but negotiated; not just mined, but regulated; and not just shipped, but screened.
For businesses, the lesson is that in the critical minerals economy, supply chains are no longer merely commercial. They are strategic, and trade policy is being built to match.
China will allow overseas investors to invest in domestic nickel and lithium futures, part of Beijing’s efforts to boost its influence in global commodities markets.
Nickel and lithium carbonate are among 14 futures and options products that will be opened up, the China Securities Regulatory Commission said in a statement on Friday. Exchanges would be urged to make preparations to implement the changes, it said, without providing any start dates.
China is the world’s largest buyer of raw materials, but benchmark prices are mainly set in financial centers like London, Singapore and New York. Beijing wants more sway over prices, and the move also dovetails with its goal of burnishing the yuan’s appeal as a global currency.
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